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1. The Bulgarian legal system allows for gaps in the law. According to Art. 46, para 1 
of the Normative Acts Law (NAL)1, when a normative act has gaps, not-provided-for cases 
are regulated by the provisions, pertaining to similar cases, if that complies with the aim of 
the act; or, lacking such provisions, by the basic principles of law in the Republic of Bulgaria. 
The text is phrased as a general prescription, which gives a specific formula for self-
development of the law. Taking into consideration its content, on one hand, and the legal 
technique used, on the other hand, we can draw two basic conclusions on the significance and 
the role of this provision. Firstly, regarding the fact that, in principle, it allows for normative 
acts to have gaps, as well as to lack rules (norms) on certain social relations. Besides, it is 
significant that, when the legislator acknowledges such a possibility, they do it fully in the 
spirit of positivism, i.e. the issue of the lacking legal rule is decided exclusively within the 
framework of legislation and on the premise that positive law, through its principles, 
constitutes an accomplished and all-encompassing system, which can give an answer to any 
specific problem. Next, it is obvious that the text does not aim at giving a definition, but, 
rather, at showing what is to be done, when it is established that the law has gaps. The 
definition of “legal gaps” still awaits clarification in legal theory. 
Bulgarian legal literature presents no unanimous opinion as to what “legal gaps” 
means. To some, “legal gap” means the lack of a definite legal rule for the regulation of 
certain relations.2 Others believe that “legal gaps” should be seen as the compete absence  of a 
legal rule, i.e., the law has no answer to a certain issue either by direct application or by 
analogy, nor is there any exclusive rule for the mediated regulation of the case, either.3 
                                                 
1 The phrase “normative acts” here refers to whole legislation 
2 Таджер,В., Гражданско право на НРБ. Обща част, Part I, С., 1972, p.135-136. Василев,Л. Гражданско 
право на Народна република България. Обща част.С.,1956, p.107. Янев,Я. Функции на правилата на 
социалистическото общежитие при прилагането на правните норми.С.,1977, p.84. Фаденхехт,Й. 
Българско гражданско право. Обща част.С.,1929, p.90. 
3 Диков, Л. Курс по българско гражданско право. Обща част.  Volume І.,С.,1936, p.90. Same in Христов, 
В., Правоприлагане по аналогия в гражданското право. Сп.Правна мисъл, 2004, №4, p.40-41. 
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According to the first view, “legal gap” is identified by the lack of a specific prescription in a 
legal rule, while, according to the second, “legal gap” means the total lack of a legal rule and 
hence the opportunity for mobilization of extra-legal categories, eg., equity, for the solution of 
specific legal disputes. The discrepancy, which concerns the essence of the lacking legal rule, 
continues in the interpretation of relations, which may turn out to be “uncovered” by legal 
regulation. According to the first concept, legal gap refers to the lack of legal rules or, if there 
is a rule, there are gaps therein with regard to relations which come under legal regulation. In 
other words, legal gap as a conditio sine qua non, faces us with a relation, which is legally 
regulated and which demands legal provision. Hence the conclusion that legal gaps pertain to 
all cases which fail the regulation of legal facts.4 The other view proposes a broader formula 
claiming that through instances of legal gaps we encounter facts and relations, which are 
within the sphere of legal impact.5 This means that the problem of legal gaps is not solved 
solely within the context of relations, which are the object of legislative regulation, but in a 
broader sense – within the context of relations, which are the object of legal impact. Such a 
claim appears better grounded as long as it is consonant with the old Roman differentiation 
between justice (jus) and law (lex), and also with the argument that the law does not exhaust 
legal regulation. Moreover, this broader view does not rule out that a certain issue be solved 
by means of what we call analogia iuris and not only by means of analogia legis.  
The quoted opinions diverge further on the scope of “lack of legal rule”. Some authors 
hold that a legal gap also means absence of direct regulation in a certain category of cases.6 
They argue that, the law, being an accomplished system, will provide the answer to a specific 
issue, in another identical legal rule. Others include within the scope of the concept both the 
lack of a direct legal rule, as well as the lack of a similar one.7 The solution to the specific 
problem should then be sought in the spirit of the law (ratio legis) and its general principles. 
As for reasons for the existence of legal gaps, these are primarily objective ones. On 
one hand, the legislator cannot predetermine all the cases that may arise, on the other, it 
should be taken into consideration that life itself undergoes change. According to some, 
however, the subjective factor also has a role in the existence of legal gaps. Some authors 
speak of it indirectly agreeing that a legal rule can be devoid of meaning, i.e. as the 
consequence of legislative oversight.8 For example, some claim that in a number of cases the 
                                                 
4 Таджер,В., op.cit., p.136. 
5 Христов,В., op.cit, p.41. 
6 Василев,Л., op.cit., p.107. Фаденхехт,Й., op.cit., p. 90. 
7 Христов,В., op.cit., p. 40. Таджер, В., op.cit., p. 136. 
8 Таджер,В., op.cit., p. 136. 
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legislator allows for certain relations, which are neither explicitly regulated, nor prohibited, 
either.9 But the problem is that not every single omission of the legislator should be seen as a 
gap. Silence on a certain issue might just as well be dictated by the wish to entrust the solution 
of a specific question to the discretion of the court. Therefore, there is no legal gap when the 
specific case can be subsumed under a more general rule, which can be applied, or when the 
legal rule contains abstract formulae (good faith, morals) offered as a general direction on the 
application of the law. Neither is there a legal gap, when the existing legal prescription does 
not suit cases of recent emergence and its application seems unjust. 
Bulgarian legal literature also suggests some particular instances of legal gaps. Apart 
from the cases of lack of legal rules, it is accepted that there is a legal gap also whenever there 
is a legal rule, which is devoid of sense and which cannot be clarified by way of 
interpretation, or when there is a legal rule, which contradicts another legal rule and the two 
negate each other.10 In other words, a legal gap does not stem from the lack of a legal rule, but 
refers to an existing legal rule, which demonstrates a serious fault in the sense that it is either 
meaningless or is in collision with another rule. Such a statement   does not deserve full 
support, because it is constructed in a mechanical rather than in a logical fashion. To speak of 
a legal rule devoid of sense is a contradictions in adiecto. If a rule is meaningless, this simply 
means that there is no legal rule. On the other hand, one cannot claim that “mutual negation” 
itself identifes a legal gap, because it is not clear whether it leaves the specific case within the 
framework of legal regulation or not.  
The criterion whether a legal rule exists or not is the only one, which Bulgarian legal 
literature accepts so as to differentiate among various legal gaps. There are no other 
differentiations. In older writings authors who are under the influence of Zitelmann, the 
German civil law author and his view from the beginning of 19th century, also accept the 
division of legal gaps into “genuine” and “non-genuine”.11 
When we speak about the opinions on legal gaps, expressed in Bulgarian legal 
writings, we should also note the discrepancy of views on the nature of the activity 
concerning the filling in of gaps. Most authors opine that this activity is part of the application 
of the law: that the law evolves and that in this manner it goes on both on its own as well as 
with the help of logic12. Others, however, think that this is no ordinary application of the law, 
but the creation of new legal rules, which in spite of being derivative, are still contingent by 
                                                 
9 Христов, В.,op.cit., p. 40. 
10 Фаденхехт, Й., op.cit., p. 90. Таджер,В., op.cit., p. 136. Христов,В., op.cit., p. 41. 
11 Диков, Л., op.cit., p. 89-90. 
12 Василев, Л., op.cit., p. 106. Таджер, В., op.cit., p. 136. Христов, В., op.cit., p. 42. 
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nature. When the Constitutional Court fills in legal gaps, it does not apply the law, it creates 
it. Although the two activities are part of one and the same process, they are entirely different 
and never merge into one.13 Both arguments agree that this activity concerns relations, which 
are in the domain of legal impact. The discrepancy, however, is a conceptual one and 
concerns their attitude towards the issue whether acting legal rules and principles per se form 
a complete and accomplished system for the regulation of social relations. As for the 
correlation between gap- filling and interpretation, a difference is being acknowledged – the 
first case acknowledges the exact meaning of the law, whereas the other one suggests the 
presumed will of the legislator. However, they should not be opposed to each other, because 
both filling in of gaps and interpretation are intellectual activities, using the same tools of 
grammar and logic.14  
2. In its jurisprudence the Constitutional Court prefers to talk about “legislative gaps”. 
It uses the term to identify gaps in existing legislation, i.e.,  a total lack of legal regulation for 
the specific case – e.g. with regard to the possibility to request recusal of a constitutional 
justice, if they, in their capacity as Member of Parliament took part in the adoption of the law, 
which is being challenged before the Constitutional Court (Ruling № 1/95 on constitutional 
case (c.c.) № 9/95); lack of legal definition of the category “equitable monetary 
compensation”  (Decision № 6/06 on c.c. № 5/06), etc. Besides, the lack of regulation may 
result from the exercise of its basic function: review over the constitutionality of laws. The 
concept  that Constitutional Court decisions declare a  law unconstitutional and that these 
decisions  have an annulling effect ex nunc, may lead to a legislative gap (Decision № 15/96 
on c.c. № 14/96; decision 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95). I would also like to point out that the 
Constitutional Court has tackled the issue of legislative gaps in its jurisprudence in most 
general terms only and that it has used this term to simply indicate that there is lack of legal 
regulation on a certain issue. Moreover, the lack of regulation is seen in the broadest possible 
sense as a regulatory omission, a lack of rules on a particular issue, on which the Constitution 
prescribes regulation by law, or the declaration of a certain law unconstitutional.  
3. The Constitutional Court follows the assumption that it is not competent to consider 
claims concerning existing gaps in laws on the grounds that its sole competence is to deal 
with laws already adopted (Ruling № 2/94 on c.c. № 1/94) and that Parliament only has the 
power to adopt a respective legal regulation on the principle of separation of powers (Ruling 
                                                 
13 Ганев,В., Трудове по обща теория на правото, С., 1998, p. 304. 
14 Апостолов, Ив. Еволюция на континенталната тълкувателна теория. ГЮФ СУ „Св.Кл.Охридски”, 
1945/46, т.XLI., p. 45-46. Таджер,  В., op.cit., p. 136. Христов, В., op.cit., p. 42. 
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№ 2/96 on c.c. № 5/96). In a dissenting opinion over c.c. №1/94, however, there emerges 
another view. According to it, the Constitutional Court is competent to assess whether a 
legislative gap may lead to the unconstitutionality of an entire law. The argument in its favour 
is that constitutional review assesses not only a specific rule, but the whole system of binding 
rules, projected upon social relations as well. That is why, there might be occasions when 
social relations will be regulated unconstitutionally due to lack of certain legal rules, despite 
the fact that the legal rules, which regulate those relations, will not be unconstitutional by 
themselves if we consider them in isolation. This opinion on the possibility that the 
Constitutional Court assess whether the lack of legal regulation may serve as basis for the 
declaration of an entire law unconstitutional remains fairly rare. 
4. The Constitutional Court is a public authority, a body of State power, whose basic 
function is to exercise review over the constitutionality of laws. According to Art. 1 of the 
Constitutional Court Law (CCL), it ensures the supremacy of the Constitution. This provision 
is decisive for the legal status of the Constitutional Court and, consequently, for its powers. 
Actually, the legal regulation of this institution in Bulgaria largely follows the model, which 
became current in Europe under the influence of H. Kelsen. The Constitutional Court is a 
public authority, part of the public institution’s system – its competence stems directly from 
the provision of Art. 149 of the Constitution, which specifies its powers. More specifically, it 
is equal to the supreme bodies of the three Powers, but it does not interfere with their activity. 
As a public authority the Constitutional Court has its own function – to review the 
constitutionality of laws. It is, therefore, directly related to legislation, but it is not a legislator 
itself. According to Art. 62, para 1 of the Constitution legislative power in the Republic of 
Bulgaria is exercised by the National Assembly. In other words, Parliament is sole legislator. 
The Constitutional Court is called upon to review the compliance between laws and the 
Constitution.15 In legal theory, some authors try to avoid the formula of Art. 62, para 1 of the 
Constitution that the National Assembly is sole legislator and adopt the compromising stance 
that the activity of the Constitutional Court is not legislative, but identical to rule-creation.16 
Apparently they are, likewise, not inclined to regard constitutional review as “negative 
legislation”, and give review and the concept of “legislator” a meaning different from the 
meanings which refer to the competence of the National Assembly.      
                                                 
15 Стойчев,Ст., Конституционно право.Пето допълнено издание. С., 2002, p. 585. Друмева, Ем. 
Конституционното правосъдие в системата на разделените власти in „Конституционният съд в 
демократичната държава”.С., 2006, p. 23 and following.  
16 Пенев, П.Тълкувателното правомощие на Конституционния съд на Република България. in 
„Конституционният съд и демократичната държава”, С., 2006, p. 157. 
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In Decision № 18/93 on c.c. № 19/93 the Constitutional Court accepted that, although 
it is called “court”, it is not a body which administers justice, nor is it part of the judiciary. 
The main argument is that the Constitution itself takes the Constitutional Court out of the 
system of the judiciary by means of regulating its functions in a separate chapter. The 
conclusion that the Constitutional Court is outside the system of the judiciary has been 
criticized in legal literature on the grounds that the Court is a body of the judiciary, because it 
considers legal disputes and thus administers justice.17 But since the essence of the activity, 
entrusted to this Court in the Constitution, is a specific one, it should be defined as a special 
court of constitutional justice. Still, when one defines the legal status of the Constitutional 
Court, one should start from its basic function, i.e., review constitutionality of the laws. In this 
sense it does not administer justice. Indeed, when the Court reviews constitutionality of laws, 
its activity looks like a judicial administration of justice, but its very essence makes it 
different from ordinary justice. Beyond constitutional review, the Constitution gives the Court 
other powers and these are related to the ruling of legal disputes. 
According to Art. 151, para 2 of the Constitution, the laws, which have been declared 
unconstitutional, are not to be applied as from the day on which the Court’s decision comes 
into force. This phrasing gives rise to different reactions in legal doctrine. According to one 
set of opinions, the Constitution explicitly proclaims that an unconstitutional law is also non-
applicable. Non-applicability has the meaning of postponement. The formulation has its logic 
in the role and status of the Constitutional Court – it does not share the legislative power of 
the National Assembly and it is the Assembly only that can abrogate laws (Art. 84 of the 
Constitution). As long as an unconstitutional law is not applied, it remains pending, until the 
legislator settles the emerging legal consequences (Art. 22, para 4 CCL).18 In this sense, it 
would be unjustified to define the Constitutional Court as a “negative legislator”.19 The main 
problem of this argument, however, is that it leaves open the issue concerning the legal effect 
of the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a law.20  
According to the other set of views, the meaning of the provision of Art. 151, para 2 of 
the Constitution is that the law, which has been declared unconstitutional, ceases to be a 
normative regulator, loses its effect and is therefore practically repealled. When a rule ceases 
                                                 
17 Сталев, Ж.Същност на Конституционния съд. in „Проблеми на конституцията и на конституционното 
правосъдие”.С., 2002, p. 79. 
18 Друмева, Ем. Конституционно право.С., 1995, p. 492. Мръчков, В., За правната сила на решенията на 
Конституционния съд, които установяват противоконституционност на законите. Сп. Съвременно право, 
1998, № 6, p. 8. 
19 Стойчев,Ст., op.cit., p. 585.  
20 Only in one case, when the law is adopted by an incompetent institution, it is null and void (Art. 22, para 3 
CCL). 
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to be in effect, it ceases to be a source of law. The grounds for the use of the term “non-
applicability” should be defined as political ones.21 Decision № 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95 of the 
Constitutional Court accepted that the coming into force of the decision, declaring a law 
unconstitutional, annuls the law on the strength of the decision and its constitutive effect. 
Annulment of a law is equal to its abrogation by the National Assembly (Art. 84 of the 
Constitution). With this decision, the Constitutional Court actually reinforced the argument 
about its being a “negative legislator”, i.e. the annulment of the law ex nunc due to its 
unconstitutionality functions as abrogation of a law by another law. In this sense the 
Constitutional Court has limited legislative power: to abrogate laws, which are 
unconstitutional.22 
Decision № 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95 made another significant step forward. According 
to it, when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional, and this in turn  abrogates 
or modifies an existing law, the latter restores its effect in the phrasing prior to the abrogation 
or modification from the moment the Court’s decision comes into force. The Constitutional 
Court argument is that, unless such a “resurrection” of the abrogated law is allowed, an 
unacceptable legislative gap will emerge. In this way Decision № 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95 fills 
in a gap in the constitutional regulation of the Court, namely, how to overcome the adverse 
effects following the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a law. In this par the Decision 
makes a substantial contribution with regard to the modification of the formulation about the 
Court’s legal status. With its acceptance the Constitutional Court actually claims that, as long 
as it not only repeals the law, which has been declared unconstitutional, but also restores the 
preceding law, it is actually closer to the position of a “positive legislator”. Even those in 
support of the decision immediately opposed the dogma of the omnipotence of the National 
Assembly.23 
5. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria has a power, which is rarely 
seen in the normative regulation of constitutional justice. It can give binding interpretations of 
the Constitution. This is a separate power and comes first among the prerogatives of the 
Constitutional Court (Art. 149, para 1, item 1 of the Constitution). The interpretation of the 
                                                 
21 Неновски, Н. Конституционното правосъдие – изпитание за традиционното правно мислене. in 
„Конституционния съд и правното действие на неговите решения”. С.,1996, p. 50 and following. Сталев, 
Ж. Силата на решенията на Конституционния съд, обявяващи закон за противоконституционен. in 
„Проблеми на конституцията и на конституционното правосъдие”.С., 2002, p.103. 
22 Same in Танчев, Ев. Учредителната власт в Конституцията на Република България от 1991 г. 
Сп.Съвременно право, 1995, №5, p. 35. 
23 Сталев,Ж., Анализ на решение № 22 от 31 октомври 1995 г.- на Конституционния съд. in „Проблеми на 
конституцията и на конституционното правосъдие”.С., 2002, p. 131. 
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Constitutional Court is official, i.e. binding and abstract (Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05). In 
Ruling № 4/04 on c.c. № 9/07 the Court rejects the possibility that the interpretation of the 
Constitution transforms it into a “positive legislator”; the power to interpret should not be 
used to seek and achieve circumvention of constitutionally established powers. This Ruling 
expresses a trend in the recent jurisprudence of the Court – its unwillingness, when 
interpreting the Constitution, to be a “positive legislator” (see also Ruling № 1/06 on c.c. № 
10/05; Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05). This position is justified through the argument that 
only the National Assembly can legislate and that the Constitutional Court should not 
“substitute” it in its function. As for the meaning of Constitutional Court power to interpret 
the Constitution, it aims at clarifying the sense of constitutional provisions, the connections 
between them and other provisions, as well as the principles of the Constitution. Of course, in 
a number of instances the Court’s interpretation of a constitutional text did add much more to 
the normative sense of the Constitution than to its clarification. For example, in Decision № 
22/95 on c.c. № 25/95 the Court proceeded from the basic principles of the Constitution 
(analogia iuris) to rule that its decisions not only abrogate the law, which was declared 
unconstitutional, but that they also restore the provisions, which this same law had abrogated. 
In Decision № 3/03 on c.c. № 22/02 the Court determines which constitutional amendments 
lie within the competence of the Grand National Assembly and which are the ones an ordinary 
Parliament may make. There are other examples as well. From this point of view, the 
Constitutional Court turns into a legislator and its interpretative decisions have the nature of 
sources of law, or, more specifically, subsidiary sources of law. It should, therefore, be 
accepted that the Court, while exercising its power to interpret, functions as no ordinary 
legislator, but that its decisions have the same power as constitutional rules. 
In Bulgarian legal theory opinions divide as to whether the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, are sources of law and 
further on, whether the Constitutional Court becomes a “positive legislator” through such 
decision making.24  Still, scholars are unanimous that the power of the Court to interpret the 
Constitution is essential and that this power has important consequences, thus suggesting that 
it should be exercised cautiously and reasonably. Legal theory sustains that the interpretative 
power of the Constitutional Court under Art. 149, para 1, item 1 of the Constitution includes 
                                                 
24 This issue is tackled in the affirmative in Неновски, Н., Относно решение № 22 от 31 октомври 1995 г. на 
Конституционния съд. in „Проблеми на конституцията и на конституционното правосъдие”.С., 2002, p. 
101; Сталев, Ж. Тълкуване на Конституцията от Конституционния съд въз основа на чл.149, ал.1, т.1 от 
Конституцията, p. 151; Зартов,Яв. В „Конституционно правосъдие на Република България”, С., 2004, p. 
283. For the opposite view, see Стойчев, Ст., op.cit., p. 595; Спасов, Б. Конституционният съд. С., 1998, p. 
75; Костов, М. Една година Конституционен съд на Република България. -Правна мисъл, 1993, № 1, p. 11. 
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the filling in of gaps in the constitutional regulation. Arguments in favour are found in the 
general nature of the provision of Art. 46 of the NAL, which encompasses the hypothetical 
clarification of the meaning of unclear provisions, as well as  instances in which gaps arise 
due to the non-existence of legal regulation.25 However, the powers of the Constitutional 
Court cannot be amended or abrogated by law (Art. 149, para 2 of the Constitution). 
Therefore, the establishment of a power of the Court by means of referring to a law is not 
entirely appropriate. 
6. The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria is fons et origo of the legal order and 
the entire legal system. Art. 5, para 1 of the Constitution postulates that the Constitution is the 
Supreme Law and that no other laws may contradict it. The supremacy of the Constitution is 
first expressed in the fact that its provisions have originary nature. Their content does not 
presuppose that they comply with another superordinate legal act. Constitutional supremacy is 
also manifest in the fact that the Constitution regulates the main principles and rules, which 
pre-determine the content of legal regulation and which as a result evolve in primary and 
secondary legislation.26 The primacy of the Constitution has a formal aspect, which relates to 
the observance of hierarchy in the system of sources of law, and which determines the 
substantive content of all remaining sources. Ultimately, the primacy of the Constitution is 
also a matter of its legal power. As far as its effect goes, the supremacy of the Constitution 
provides the requirement that laws comply with it and that they may be declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
The general phrasing of Art. 5, para 1 of the Constitution formulates  the priority of all 
provisions of the Constitution over all other normative acts, regardless of the fact whether 
they have been phrased in an abstract or a more specific fashion, and whether they proclaim 
main principles or other issues. However, the system of constitutional provisions has its own 
hierarchy – for example, the norms of international treaties, which have become part of 
domestic legislation, based on Art. 5, para 4 of the Constitution, are superordinate to 
constitutional provisions, wherein the legislator reserves the right to establish a specific legal 
regulation. 
Another aspect of the primacy of the Constitution is its direct application. This 
principle has been formulated in explicit terms in Art. 5, para 2 of the Constitution. The 
provisions of the constitution are part and parcel of existing law and their application does not 
need any mediation from the legal or technical point of view (Decision № 10/94 on c.c. № 
                                                 
25 Сталев,Ж. Анализ на решение № 22 от 31 октомври 1995 г. на Конституционния съд, p. 76-77. 
26 Танчев, Ев. Въведение в конституционното право.С.,2003, p. 171. 
P a g e  |  
 
10 
4/94). The absence of a law or secondary legislation or even the existence of a gap in a 
specific law does not serve as an excuse to refuse to apply the Constitution in a case of legal 
dispute. If a law or a piece of subsidiary legislation contradicts the Constitution, the bodies, 
which apply the law, should apply the Basic Law instead. 
Finally, the primacy of the Constitution also finds expression in its direct abrogating 
effect as regards existing laws, which are in contradiction with the Constitution (§ 3 of the 
Transitional and Concluding Provisions of the Constitution). 
7. The legal force of Acts adopted by the State as part of Bulgaria’s legal system, is 
determined by the position of the institution in the State hierarchy and the nature of social 
relations they regulate. Only public institutions, named in the Constitution or in law, may 
adopt normative acts. The Constitution and the NAL determine the types of normative and 
non-normative acts State bodies may adopt. Within the system of normative acts laws come 
next to the Constitution in legal force. According to Art. 2 of the NAL laws provide primary 
regulation or regulation, which bases itself on the Constitution, of relations, which can be 
subject to sustainable regulation. Among various other laws, pride of place is given to  
constitutional laws, which amend or supplement the Constitution. What is specific about them 
is that they do not exist on their own but are incorporated in the Constitution. In this sense, it 
is assumed that the remaining laws have less power than constitutional laws.27 Codes have 
their own place in the system of normative acts: they regulate relations within a separate 
branch of the legal system or a specific segment thereof, and they, just like any other laws, are 
subject to the same rules (Art.4 of NAL). The normative acts of the Government or the 
Ministers are based upon laws – they contain subsidiary legislation in compliance with the 
laws. The NAL defines a regulation or an ordinance as a normative act. Municipal Councils 
can also issue regulations and ordinances, but their application is restricted to matters of local 
importance.  
The National Assembly can also adopt non-normative acts, such as decisions, 
declarations and addresses. All Acts of the Assembly are subject to constitutional review by 
the Constitutional Court. The President of the Republic of Bulgaria also issues non-normative 
decrees and these are likewise subject to constitutional review. The Government and the 
Ministers adopt decisions, orders and instructions, which are also non-normative ones. 
However, they are not subject to review by the Constitutional Court, but can be challenged 
instead before the Supreme Administrative Court. 
                                                 
27 Стойчев, Ст., op.cit., p. 450. 
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International treaties have their specific place in the normative system of the Republic 
of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Constitution follows the principle of primacy of international 
treaties over domestic legislation. International treaties, ratified in line with constitutional 
arrangements, promulgated and having come into force for the Republic of Bulgaria, are part 
of the country’s domestic legislation and have precedence over those rules, which contradict 
them. International treaties, which are part of Bulgaria’s domestic law, have a direct 
abrogating effect over those provisions of primary and secondary legislation, which contradict 
them (Decision № 7/92 on c.c. № 6/92). Their legal force places them right after the 
Constitution, but before the laws, adopted by the National Assembly. This is due to the fact 
that the Constitution requires harmonization of international treaties with the Basic Law prior 
to ratification (Art. 85, para 1 and Art.149, item 4 of the Constitution). 
8. In its jurisprudence the Constitutional Court has several times ruled expressly on the 
issue whether the Constitution has gaps. For example, Ruling № 2/95 on c.c. № 5/96 notes 
that the Constitution has no provision to regulate the exercising of local governance after local 
elections have been quashed; nor is this regulated in existing legislation. On this issue of 
interpretation the Court submits that there is a gap in legislation. In another case it concludes 
that there is a gap in legislation, regarding the protection of justices’ rights or control over 
Supreme Judicial Council decisions (Ruling № 2/94 on c.c. №1/94). In a third case the Court 
determines that the issue about the recusal of constitutional justices is not normatively 
regulated and that this opens a gap in Bulgarian constitutional justice (Ruling № 1/95 on c.c. 
№ 9/95). Legal theory also notes the possibility of gaps in the Constitution itself –e.g., what 
the Constitutional Court should do, when, on the basis that an application is ill-grounded, it 
had rejected its claim to declare a law constitutional, but afterwards the Court was re-
approached on the same issue: to dismiss the application on the basis of the principle ne bis in 
idem or to hold a hearing and to deliver the same decision as the previous one.28 At the same 
time the Constitutional Court also maintains that the Constitution does not allow for gaps in 
legal order, based on the principle of the rule of law, as proclaimed in Art. 4, para 1 of the 
Constitution and its Preamble  (Decision № 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95). In other words, an 
argument is raised that the rule of law does not allow for legislative gaps. 
According to Art. 149, para 1, item 2 of the Constitution the Constitutional Court rules 
on applications for the declaration of unconstitutionality of laws and other acts of the National 
Assembly (decisions, declarations, addresses and the Rules of Organization and Functions of 
                                                 
28 Сталев,Ж. Анализ на решение № 22 от 31 октомври 1995 г. на Конституционния съд, p. 136. 
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the National Assembly), as well as acts of the President (decrees, addresses and messages). 
Therefore, constitutional review covers only some normative acts, i.e., the laws and the Rules 
of Organization and Functions of the National Assembly. The remaining normative acts of 
other State institutions, having the necessary normative competence, do not fall within the 
scope of this review. Non-normative acts may also be subject to such review 
Constitutional review is subsequent. Under Art. 17 of the CCL applications 
concerning the declaration of unconstitutionality of laws and other acts may be made from the 
day of the laws’ promulgation. The fact that the vacatiо legis has not expired, makes no 
difference. Further on, constitutional review over National Assembly laws and other acts, just 
like review over those of the President, is an abstract one, i.e. it is exercised without reference 
to any particular dispute. 
According to Art. 149, para 1, item 2 of the Constitution constitutional review extends 
to every law. There is no doubt that review may impact either upon the law in its entirety or 
upon some of its provisions. However, applications concerning the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of a law in its entirety are fairly rare (Decision № 14/01 on c.c. № 7/01; 
Decision № 29/98 on c.c. № 28/98).  
Over the past 15 years Bulgaria has had no law, adopted by a referendum. Legal 
literature, however, accepts that referendum-adopted laws are not subject to constitutional 
review, because under Art. 149, para 1, item 2 of the Constitution it is only laws, adopted by 
the National Assembly, that may be declared unconstitutional.29   
The Constitutional Court accepts that laws, which amend or supplement the 
Constitution, can likewise be subject to constitutional review. Such review however, has 
certain limitations – it scrutinizes constitutional procedure: the submission, hearing and 
adoption of the law in terms of strict observance of constitutional arrangements as well as the 
character of the amendment itself: whether it involves issues which might be the exclusive 
competence of the Grand National Assembly. There is no review over compliance of the 
amendments within the power of an Ordinary National Assembly with constitutional 
provisions, which were in force prior to the amendment’s adoption (Decision № 3/03 on c.c. 
№ 22/02). The explanation is that the Constitution itself provides for a special procedure for 
its amendment by a law, adopted by an ordinary National Assembly. In this way in 2006 the 
Court declared unconstitutional the new para 4 of Art. 129 of the Constitution, because it was 
in contradiction with the basic principle of separation of powers (Decision № 7/06 on c.c. 
                                                 
29 Спасов,Б. Конституционният съд, p. 87; Пенев,П. В Конституционно правосъдие, p. 130. 
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№6/06).30 Legal theory, however, sustains that such review is inadmissible, since such laws 
do not exist on their own and are incorporated in the Constitution.31 At the same time, one 
should note that the Constitutional Court does not have the right to rule over the 
constitutionality of acts, adopted by the Grand National Assembly.  
As international treaties, which have been ratified and have come into force, become 
part of domestic legislation and enjoy the status and power of a law (Art. 5, para 4 and Art. 85 
of the Constitution), they are also subject to constitutional review (Decision № 9/99 on c.c. № 
8/99). Initially Constitutional Court jurisprudence prescribed that only a ratification act could 
be subject to constitutional review by the Constitutional Court, but later on jurisprudence was 
changed in compliance with the said Decision of 1999; it was accepted that a ratification law 
incorporates the international treaty and that both law and treaty should be seen as a single 
act. This was subsequently clarified through the statement that review over the ratification law 
also extends to international treaties, subject to ratification, but only if those treaties refer to 
public international law (Ruling № 4/02 on c.c. № 6/02). Here we should add that, according 
to Art. 149, para 1, item 4 the Constitutional Court has the power to rule before ratification on 
international treaties, concluded by the Republic of Bulgaria, in terms of their compliance 
with the Constitution as well as on the compliance of these laws with generally accepted 
norms of international law and international treaties, to which Bulgaria is a State Party. Such 
an example of constitutional review is obviously a preceding one. This, however, does not 
exclude constitutional review after the treaty’s ratification (Decision № 9/99 on c.c. № 8/99).  
Ruling № 1/96 on c.c. № 31/95 of the Constitutional Court accepted the admissibility 
of applications asking it to declare the unconstitutionality of laws, if they were adopted prior 
to the Constitution. Initially, it held the opposite view (Ruling of 29.12.1991 on c.c. № 1/91). 
The main argument for the alteration was that the Republic of Bulgaria follows the rule of 
law, where laws, including those preceding the Constitution, cannot be in contradiction with 
it. The Constitution does not differentiate as to when a law was adopted. As for laws, which 
had been adopted and had come into force prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and which 
had exhausted their effect by the time of its adoption, the Constitutional Court ruled that it 
was not competent to pronounce an opinion on their constitutionality (Ruling № 1/99 on c.c. 
№ 37/98). The argument is that, if a law had ceased functioning before the adoption of the 
                                                 
30 The text empowered the President to remove the Supreme Cassation Court and Supreme Administrative Court 
Presidents and the Prosecutor General, if they commit a serious crime or systematically fail to exercise their 
duties, by proposal of a 2/3 majority of the Members of Parliament. 
31 Стойчев,Ст., op.cit., p. 590. 
P a g e  |  
 
14 
Constitution, it would be inadmissible to assess whether it complies with the Constitution or 
not.  
When in review of the constitutionality of laws and other acts of Parliament and the 
acts of President, the Constitutional Court assesses their compliance with constitutional 
provisions. An Act can be deemed unconstitutional, if it was adopted in violation of a 
procedure, set in the Constitution, e.g. if it was not adopted in two sessions of voting, as Art. 
88, para 1 of the Constitution provides (Decision № 3/07 on c.c. № 2/07). It cannot, however, 
be declared unconstitutional when its adoption violates a procedure, set in another Act, for 
example the Rules of the Organization and Functions of the National Assembly (Ruling № 
3/07 on c.c. № 8/07). The assessment, whether a law is unconstitutional, is based exclusively 
on the juxtaposition of its content with the provisions and principles of the Constitution.  
9. Ruling № 2/94 on c.c. № 1/94 of the Constitutional Court expressly states that the 
Court is not competent to rule on claims about existing gaps in laws. It does not have such 
powers, because it is competent to deal solely with laws which have already been adopted. In 
Ruling № 1/06 on c.c. № 10/05 the Court develops the argument further, stating that it cannot 
interpret a certain provision in the Constitution if that interpretation would infringe upon a 
power, bestowed by the Constitution on the National Assembly. The Court cannot, by virtue 
of interpretation, give specific instructions to the National Assembly how to act, let alone, 
limit its sovereign function of sole legislator of State. Thus, the issue of legislative gaps is 
extraneous to constitutional review of the Court due to its belief that it cannot infringe upon a 
power, which the Constitution has bestowed solely upon the National Assembly. 
In a number of cases the Constitution tasks the National Assembly to regulate a certain 
matter by law. One could assume that, as longs as the Constitution prescribes the legislative 
regulation of certain issues, it does not regulate the matter itself and, therefore, there is a gap 
in it, which the legislator is required to fill in (Decision № 2/06 on c.c. № 9/05; Ruling № 
1/06 on c.c. №10/05). The Constitution prescribes the act of issuance, in most general terms 
while it is the legislator, who is competent to propose some solution in accordance with the 
accepted legislative policy, bearing in mind the principles and requirements it poses. Whether 
the law will be accepted and when acceptance will take place is an issue within the exclusive 
ambit of the National Assembly, since it is expressly empowered by the Constitution to act in 
this sense. The Constitution does not bestow upon the Constitutional Court the power to 
watch over National Assembly compliance with what the Constitution has tasked it to do, 
neither is the Court empowered to bind the Assembly to adopt the law in question. The 
Constitutional Court is not, furthermore, to give instructions to the National Assembly as to 
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how to fill in the existing legislative gap. It reviews the constitutionality of laws (Art. 149, 
para 1, item 2 of the Constitution) and can, consequently, deal only with an actual normative 
fact. On the other hand, the point of such steps obviously goes well beyond the parameters of 
constitutional review. Besides, the powers of the Constitutional Court are strictly and 
extensively listed and no such a power could be justified. That is why the Court cannot deal 
with such gaps in the Constitution, nor can it rule that they be filled in. 
When the Constitution tasks the National Assembly to regulate a certain matter by 
law, the structure and content of the normative regulation is decided upon in accordance with 
the accepted legislative policy. The National Assembly should, however, also take into 
consideration the principles and specific requirements of the Constitution. If the Constitution 
contains certain prescriptions and the legislator does not take them into consideration, one 
cannot say that there are gaps in legal regulation. The Constitution has direct application (Art. 
5, para 2), therefore, the respective legal regulation should be inferred from the Basic Law 
itself. The Constitutional Court does not have the power to give instructions in this sense. 
10. It was already mentioned that Art. 149, para 1 of the Constitution gives the Court 
the power to issue binding interpretations of the Constitution. As legal theory affirms, the said 
provision covers only a certain type of interpretation – the official and abstract one.32 Besides, 
this interpretation concerns only the Constitution, not laws themselves. Interpretation means 
clarification of the exact meaning of the Constitution. It reveals the normative intentions of 
the legislator and hence encompasses normative prescriptions. When the Court’s 
jurisprudence talks about interpretation, it usually means clarification of the exact sense of a 
given constitutional provision (Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05; Ruling of 17.08.2004 on c.c. 
№ 3/04). It is a standing practice of the Constitutional Court also to take into consideration 
the Constitution’s Preamble when interpreting its provisions (Decision № 1/05 on c.c. 
№.8/04; Decision № 6/04  on c.c. № 7/04 г.; Decision № 11/03 on c.c. № 9/03). Although the 
Preamble is not normative in essence, it sets the basic democratic and humanity principles, 
which inspired the Constitution. Since interpretation means clarification of the exact sense of 
the Constitution, it cannot supplement or make amendments to the Basic Law (Ruling of 
17.05.2004 on c.c. № 3/04). Nor can it aim at circumventing, substituting or violating 
constitutionally established powers, let alone giving concrete instructions to the National 
Assembly or other public institutions (Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05). While interpreting, 
the Constitutional Court should not feel bound to always give a thorough answer to the 
                                                 
32 Сталев, Ж. Тълкуване на Конституцията от Конституционния съд въз основа на чл.149, ал.1, т.1 от 
Конституцията, p. 151 
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questions posed to it, because in this way it may substitute the nature of its own power and 
turn into a consultative organ or a “positive legislator” (Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05).  
The Constitutional Court has outlined the functions of interpreting which lie in its 
power in Art. 149, para 1, item 1 of the Constitution. First among them is the need “through 
interpretation of constitutional provisions to build a clear and non-contradictory system of 
rules”. The second function of interpretation is to “prevent the use of the sanctioning powers 
of the Constitutional Court and, specifically, its power to declare a law unconstitutional” 
(Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05). In this sense through its power under Art. 149, para 1 of 
the Constitution the Constitutional Court affirms the supremacy of the Basic Law and 
contributes to the protection and observance of fundamental civic rights and freedoms. 
Legal theory maintains that the interpretative decisions of the Constitutional Court are 
subsidiary sources of law.33 The Constitutional Court is, however, much more cautious 
whenever it addresses that issue. According to it, the interpreted provision of the Constitution 
and the interpretative decision of the Court form a unity and the respective constitutional 
provision cannot be applied in a way, different from what the Constitutional Court has ruled 
on it (Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05). Consonant with this is also the claim that the Court’s 
interpretative power cannot include supplementing to or amending the Constitution (Ruling of 
17.05.2004 on c.c. №3/04). The Constitutional Court is obviously not so willing to support 
what theory describes as its function “to develop constitutional regulation through 
interpretation”.34 
To sum up, Constitutional Court jurisprudence allows for the existence of legal gaps. 
Its attitude towards the different types of gaps, however, appears to be different. On one hand, 
the Court, while interpreting the Constitution, refuses to tackle legal gaps, even when 
legislative regulation is missing on an issue, and in addition the Constitution also prescribes 
that it be regulated by law (Decision № 8/05 on c.c. № 7/05; Ruling № 1/06 on c.c. №10/05). 
Legislative delegation excludes any intervention, despite gaps in the regulation. The Court 
goes even further when it rejects applications as absent of legal basis on grounds that, it must 
not, through interpretation takes upon itself to bind the legislator or substitute it. For this 
reason the Constitutional Court is not bound to answer thoroughly all the questions an 
application may ask. Generally, if a matter should be regulated by law, this constitutes a 
                                                 
33 Сталев,Ж. Тълкуване на Конституцията от Конституционния съд въз основа на чл.149, ал.1, т.1 от 
Конституцията, p. 151; Неновски,Н., Относно решение № 22 от 31 октомври 1995 г. на Конституционния 
съд, p. 101 
34 Сталев,Ж. Анализ на решение № 22 от 31 октомври 1995 г. на Конституционния съд, p. 79. 
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ground for the Court to refuse to deal with the issue, despite the emergence of a gap in legal 
regulation.  
The situation is a different one, when constitutional review, exercised by the Court, 
results in the abrogation of the respective law and the emergence of a legislative gap. It is the 
assumption that such a gap is inadmissible which makes the Court, by virtue of interpretation, 
conclude that its decisions “resurrect” ex lege the law it had abrogated earlier. The 
Constitution may not possibly prescribe the non-application of the unconstitutional law and at 
the same time allow for a legislative gap. Thus through interpreting the Constitution (Art. 149, 
para1, item 1) the Court proclaims its power to fill in gaps in the legal regulation, set by the 
Constitution (Decision № 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95). The idea is to fill in the gaps not by means 
of instructions to the legislator, but through the effect of the decision itself. It is assumed that 
the decision is binding on everybody, including the National Assembly (Art. 14, para 6 of the 
CCL), therefore, no instructions are needed.   
Here, an issue naturally arises – to what extent are those two assumptions compatible? 
In the first case when the Court is asked to interpret texts, including texts, which assign the 
adoption of a law, it states firmly that it cannot be a “positive legislator”. In the second case, 
when a law is declared unconstitutional, the Court takes upon itself to “develop” the 
Constitution, while eliciting support not from the “letter”, but from the principles of the 
Constitution; in this manner it models further its power. Restoration of the action of an 
abrogated law itself turns the Court into a legislator. The fact that the Court does not allow, in 
its recent jurisprudence, for the admissibility of its being a “positive legislator” requires that it 
be consistent and solve any internal contradictions which arise in its stance, due to this status. 
11. The existence of legislative gaps is most often diagnosed in applications 
concerning the interpreting of constitutional provisions (Ruling № 2/96 on c.c. № 5/96; 
Ruling № 2/94 on c.c. № 1/94; Decision № 22/95 on c.c. № 25/95; Ruling № 1/96 on c.c. № 
10/95). It was also mentioned in requests about recusal of constitutional justices (Ruling № 
1/95 on c.c. № 9/95). 
The existence of a legislative gap is not unconstitutional by itself. Even the fact that 
the Constitution prescribes that a certain matter be regulated by law and then this same law 
has gaps, does not make that law unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court will only 
establish the legislative gap. Its filling in, however, would be a prerogative of the National 
Assembly. Whenever the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional, it already 
accepts that the emerging gap within the system is unconstitutional, as long as the 
Constitution itself requires that the gap be filled in. On these grounds the Court arrived at the 
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idea of “resurrecting” the law, which preceded the one, abrogated on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality. 
12. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Constitutional Court 
does not act ex officio, it cannot take the initiative to rule on the constitutionality of a law. The 
Constitutional Court can be seized a restrictively foreseen by the Constitution public 
institutions and certain number (group) of Members of Parliament: one fifth of the Members 
of Parliament, i.e. 48 of them, the President, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Cassation 
Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Prosecutor General and the Ombudsman. 
Besides the Ombudsman can approach the Constitutional Court for declaring 
unconstitutionality only of a law which infringes human rights and freedoms (Art. 150 of the 
Constitution).   
In Decision № 3/05 on c.c. № 2/05 the Constitutional Court accepted that it can be 
approached by the plenums of the Supreme Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, 
comprising all magistrates, as well as by the general assemblies of their colleges. When single 
panels of the Supreme Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court find out, while hearing 
a dispute, inconsistency between a law and the Constitution, they suspend proceedings and 
submit the issue to the Constitutional Court (Ruling № 1/97 on c.c. № 5/97). Their reason for 
approaching the Constitutional Court here is a concrete one, but the review the Court will 
exercise, is still abstract. The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria does not allow for 
individual constitutional complaints by persons before the Constitutional Court on an 
unconstitutional law. This can be done through one of the institutions, listed above, i.e. by 
proxy. In practice, the initiative will most often be taken by the Ombudsman. 
13. The decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all public authorities, 
legal entities and persons (erga omnes). This means that they are also binding on the 
Constitutional Court itself. Hence the argument that it cannot rule again on cases it has 
already ruled upon (Ruling № 4/96 on c.c. № 6/96). This is also affirmed by Art. 21, para 5 of 
the CCL, according to which no new applications on an issue may be submitted, if the Court 
has already delivered a decision or a ruling on the inadmissibility of the same issue. It is 
worth noting, however, that there are issues on which the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved – 
for example, whether the Court can review laws, adopted before the Constitution, or whether 
review covers only a ratification law or similarly, the international treaty subject to 
ratification.  
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Legal theory sustains that both the operative part and the reasoning of the decision are 
binding.35 The Court’s decisions come into force three days after promulgation, they are non-
appealable and act ex nunc. As for their effect, some of the Court’s decisions are declaratory, 
e.g., those which reject an application as ill-grounded. Other decisions are, however, 
constitutive, such as those, which declare a law unconstitutional.  
Since the decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all public institutions, 
legal entities and persons, including the National Assembly, up till now, whenever a law was 
declared unconstitutional, the National Assembly obeyed the decision. The same goes for 
decisions on interpreting the Constitution. The Court’s decisions have a decisive role in the 
elaboration of new texts, to replace those declared unconstitutional, and generally in the 
elaborations of new laws and provisions. Compliance with the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, including their reasoning, is achieved in the legislative process through different legal 
techniques – phrasing of texts in accordance with the terminology the Court used, 
modification of the systematic place of the provisions, adoption of a new approach (abstract 
or casuistic) in the elaboration of laws, etc.  
14. According to Art. 22, para 4 of the CCL the legal consequences of the law, which 
was declared unconstitutional, are settled by the National Assembly. According to the 
Assembly’s Rules of Organization and Functions, those consequences should be settled 
within two months after the Court’s decision has come into force. The provision of Art. 22, 
para 4 of the CCL envisages pending relations, which have emerged by virtue of the 
unconstitutional law. This text, however, has nothing to do with the need to supply legal 
regulation of those relations. The Constitutional Court only reviews the constitutionality of 
laws and does not have the power to give binding instructions to State bodies, including the 
National Assembly. Due to this it cannot obligate the Assembly to fill in the gaps in has 
established. The Court only notes the existence of a gap and, without giving any instructions, 
usually points out that the creation of the respective legal regulation falls within the 
competence of the National Assembly. It is solely up to the Assembly to ultimately adopt 
such regulation. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Стойчев, Ст., op.cit., p. 591 notes that the subjects of law should comply with the reasoning of the decision. 
Сталев, Ж. Сила на решенията на Конституционния съд. Обявяване на закон за противоконституционен. 
„Конституционния съд и правното действие на неговите решения”. С., 1996, p. 17 notes that what is 
binding is the core reasoning of the decision. 
